The Ukrainians have quickly converted their ferocious motivation to knowledge of the adversary, which has enabled some successful counterattacks. They moderated their unrealistic goals, centralized their operation’s command, focused resources in areas where they felt success was most likely, and improved logistics and coordination among branches. The Russians showed they were able to learn from their mistakes. In later weeks, haphazard, overoptimistic, poorly planned Russian moves caused the Russian military to be seen as something of a paper tiger, but by the 100-day point, both sides have proved worthy of each other militarily. In the first days of the war, most serious analysts believed a Ukrainian defeat was imminent. They are also in many ways more dangerous to Russia itself and its neighbors than Putin and his team of crooks and sycophants. Given that the remains of Russia’s liberal opposition largely have left the country since the war began, giving up any realistic claim on a major role in the post-Putin future, the likes of Girkin and his comrades inside and outside the invading army are the most credible non-regime force left. Their sincerity could buy them popular support if the regime weakens and is unable to keep Russians in check by repression alone. They might even end up as the country’s next revanchist driving force.
The nationalists’ voices are also important because, in the event of a Russian defeat, they probably would be heard loudly. Weighed against information coming from Ukrainian and Western sources, their insight and analysis provide much-needed balance, a job at which the Putin propaganda machine fails miserably. They also have access to sources in various branches of the invading army, from the separatist militias to the Wagner private military company to regular units. They never believed in the blitzkrieg that Putin apparently thought he was about to carry out. The nationalists openly mistrust, often despise, Putin’s top brass.
Nationalists such as Morozov and Girkin root for a Russian victory with all their empire-loving hearts, but their deep hatred of the adversary is interlaced with an equally deep respect for Ukrainians’ fighting ability. In part because of Girkin’s jealousy and frustration, his Telegram channel has been a must-read during this war. One of the key participants in the pro-Russian rebellion in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Girkin openly dreams of a role in the war, but the Kremlin regards him as not loyal enough to have earned one.
Igor Girkin, known by his nom de guerre Strelkov, also provides credible analysis of the Russian and pro-Russian troops’ troubles with poor command and logistics, as well as Moscow’s strategic failures. On the other hand, Murz - nationalist blogger Andrei Morozov - knows what he is talking about and voices his criticism at significant personal risk. I get an eerie feeling when the Institute for the Study of War, the think tank that provides some of the most detailed analysis of the battlefield situation, quotes someone nicknamed Boitsovy Kot Murz (literally, “Purr the Fighting Cat”) on the situation inside the Russian and pro-Russian separatist militaries. However, since the first days, Russian nationalists - on the ground and on the sidelines - have emerged as a surprisingly useful information source that makes parsing official Russian propaganda largely unnecessary.
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